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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATE ALLOCATION
OF PUNITIVE DAMAGE AWARDS

I.

INTRODUCTION

The perceived liability insurance crisis of the nineteen-eighties produced
an enormous amount of legislation designed to reduce awards that were
seen as crippling industry.' In 1986 alone, forty-one states passed tort
reform statutes intended to control spiralling insurance rates. 2 Punitive
damages represented one of the prime targets of the tort reformers.3 A
perception developed among the public and among influential legal commentators that punitive damages were simply a windfall for greedy plaintiffs
that was getting increasingly out of control. 4 At the same time, commentators
increasingly speculated that punitive damages could not survive a direct
5
constitutional attack.
Many state legislatures responded to this type of criticism by restricting
or otherwise altering punitive damages. 6 At least partly due to tort reform
legislation, insurance rates stabilized by the end of the decade.7 In addition,
in a string of cases from 1986 through 1991, the United States Supreme

1. See Glenn Blackmon & Richard Zeckhauser, State Tort Reform Legislation:Assessing
our Control of Risks, in TORT LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 272, 273 (Peter H. Schuck ed.,
1991) (noting "avalanche" of tort reform legislation in 1980s).
2. Id.
3. See Jim s D. GmtARi & JomH J. KIRCHER, Purn=w D~AmGEs L. & Prec. § 21.12
(1989) (discussing widespread reform of punitive damages).
4. See Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 282 (1989)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (stating that "[aiwards of punitive damages are skyrocketing"). But
see Robert A. Prentice & Mark E. Roszkowski, "Tort Reform" and the Liability "Revolution".
Defending Strict Liability in Tort for Defective Products, 27 GoNz. L. REv. 251, 262 (1992)
(citing several recent studies, including ones by Rand Corporation and by General Accounting
Office, disputing reports that punitive damages in products liability cases have gotten out of
control).
5. See generally John C. Jeffries, Jr., A Comment on the Constitutionalityof Punitive
Damages, 72 VA. L. Rnv. 139 (1986) (suggesting punitive damages are subject to Eighth
Amendment and may violate due process); Theodore B. Olson & Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr.,
ConstitutionalRestraints on the Doctrine of Punitive Damages, 17 PEPP. L. REv. 907 (1990)
(arguing that punitive damage system violates due process by permitting "arbitrary, standardless, and limitless punishment"); Malcolm E. Wheeler, The Constitutional Case fqr Reforming
Punitive Damages, 69 VA. L. REv. 269 (1983) (arguing that current punitive damages procedures
violate due process).
6. See GAnRDi & KIRCHER, supra note 3, § 21.15 (discussing tort reform statutes).
Most tort reform statutes addressing punitive damages simply place a cap on the amount that
a plaintiff can recover. Id.
7. See Oswald Johnston, Tort Law Reforms Easing Insurance Crisis, U.S. Reports,
L.A. Twm , Mar. 27, 1987, § 4, at 1 (noting lessening of insurance crisis). The author quoted
a Justice Department report stating that the widespread tort reforms of 1986 had helped ease
the "insurance crisis." Id.
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Court considered and rejected several constitutional challenges to punitive
damages.8 These factors could have rendered further discussion of punitive
damages reform superfluous. 9 However, the emotional nature of the debate
over the policy questions underlying punitive damages has maintained interest in the subject, and legislatures continue to address it.' 0
The most novel approach to punitive damage reform has taken the

shape of state allocation of punitive awards." Under a state allocation
scheme, the state takes a portion, often a significant portion, of every
punitive damage award. 2 At least ten states have now passed statutes giving
the state a percentage of punitive awards. 3 The legislatures of at least three

8. See infra notes 21-26 and accompanying text (discussing recent Supreme Court cases
considering constitutionality of traditional punitive awards).

9. See generally W. Kip Viscusr,

REFORMING PRODUCTS LiABILTY

(1991) (arguing that

additional tort reform is still needed).
10. In August of 1991, Vice-President Dan Quayle announced to the American Bar
Association (ABA) the proposals for civil justice reform formulated by the President's Council
on Competitiveness. See Douglas Jehl, Administration Calls for Wide Legal Reforms, L.A.
Tmms, Aug. 14, 1991, at Al (discussing Bush administration proposals for justice reform).
Quayle's proposal played a key role in maintaining public interest in tort reform generally and
punitive damages reform in particular. See Andrew Blum, Quayle's Proposals Still Making
Waves, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 16, 1991, at 3, 28 (noting that ABA speech generated more public
reaction than any issue involving Quayle up to that time); Marcia Coyle & Fred Strasser,
Quayle Unveils "Justice Reform" Legislation, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 17, 1992, at 5, 5 (noting that
mail Quayle received after ABA speech supported his position by ratio of 100-1).
The package Quayle unveiled to the ABA, titled the "Agenda for Civil Justice in
America," called for, among other things, strict limits on punitive damages and the transfer
from juries to judges of the power to set such penalties. See JehI, supra, at Al (discussing
Bush administration proposals for justice reform). However, these aspects of the proposal
were omitted from the related legislation submitted to Congress. S. 2180, 102d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1992); H.R. 4155, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992). The proposed legislation focused primarily
on the so-called "English" or "loser pays" rule. Id. Instead of including punitive damages
reform in the federal legislation, the Bush administration planned to incorporate its suggested
reforms of punitive damages into a proposed model state tort reform bill. See Coyle & Strasser,
supra, at 5 (discussing proposed justice reform legislation).
11. For purposes of this Note, the term "state allocation" is used to describe the practice
whereby a state receives a portion of a punitive damage award. Other commentators have
used the term "state extraction" to describe this practice. See James D. Ghiardi, Punitive
Damages: State Extraction Practice Is Subject to Eighth Amendment Limitations, 26 TORT &
INS. L.J. 119, 120 (1990) (referring to state's receipt of share of punitive award as "state
extraction"); Samuel E. Klein et al., Punitive Damages, in LmEL LmoAToN 1990, at 297, 337
(PLI Pats., Copyrights, Trademarks & Literary Prop. Course Handbook' Series No. 338, 1992)
(same). Because this Note argues that the state has a legitimate and constitutional interest in
a share of a punitive award prior to the vesting of the award in the plaintiff, the Note
substitutes the term "allocation" for thd more pejorative "extraction."
12. See, e.g., Iu.. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1207 (Smith-Hurd 1987) (giving trial
court discretion to apportion award among plaintiff, plaintiff's attorney, and state). Some
states receive a portion of punitive awards only in certain types of cases. E.g., IOWA CODE
ANN. § 668A.1 (West 1987) (allocating to state 75% of punitive awards in cases where
defendant's conduct was not aimed specifically at plaintiff).
13. See infra Appendix (citing and describing state allocation statutes).
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currently have punitive damages allocation bills under considother states
4
eration.'
State allocation has gained favor among tort reformers because it
resolves many of the public policy criticisms of punitive awards.'" It erases
much of the greedy plaintiff stigma by diverting the proceeds of a punitive
award to the government, which can put the money to some public benefit.
It may also reduce the incidence of such awards by reducing the incentive
to sue for punitive damages.' 6
However, the entry of the state into private litigation to receive a share
of a punitive award presents several novel and complex issues of constitutional law. First, by appropriating a share of a civil award, the government
may effect an unconstitutional taking of the plaintiff's property. On the
other hand, the recovery of a punitive award by the government may trigger
criminal constitutional protections in favor of the defendant, primarily
through the Excessive Fines Clause and the Double Jeopardy Clause.
Which constitutional issues apply depends largely on the characterization
of the government's interest in the award. Neither legislatures nor courts
have resolved conclusively the related questions of when the government's
interest attaches and how, or whether, that interest fits into traditional
mechanisms of government appropriation.1 7 If the government's interest
does not attach until after the entry of judgment, it appears that the state
appropriates a portion of the plaintiff's property. Under that approach, the
action resembles either a taking, in the constitutional sense, or a tax.18 If,

14. See Andrew Blum, States Want Share of Punitives, NAT'L L.J., March 8, 1993, at
3, 3 (noting that Indiana,'Jew Jersey, and Texas are currently considering allocation bills).
15. See infra part III (discussing policy implications of state allocation).
16. See infra notes 202-04 and accompanying text (discussing potential for state allocation
to regulate punitive awards).
17. Only the Georgia allocation statute explicitly establishes the point at which the state's
interest attaches. See GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(2) (Michie 1987) (giving state rights of
judgment creditor upon entry of judgment stipulating punitive damages).
18. State constitutional guarantees probably prevent state allocation schemes from operating as taxes. The constitutions of at least 43 states contain taxation "uniformity clauses."
WADE J. NEwHousE, JR., CoNsrruTioNAL UNIoRmrr AND EQUALITY IN STATE TAXATION 3
(1959). These clauses vary widely in form and in interpretation, but virtually all would have
an effect on state allocation as a taxation vehicle. All uniformity clauses place restrictions on
the taxation of property. Id. at 11-47. These clauses typically require a strict uniform rate of
taxation on all property, although some require only a uniform rate of taxation within
"classes" of property. Id. at 643-766. If a punitive damage award is in fact property for tax
purposes, it would probably fail under those provisions. The federal tax code treats damage
awards as income, I.R.C. § 104(2)(b), and punitive damage awards should probably be treated
as income for state taxation purposes as well. Not all uniformity clauses apply to income tax.
NwHousE, supra, at 644-50. Most that do require uniformity within "classes" of income,
and the classes must be "reasonable." Id. Under these provisions, questions would arise about
the reasonableness of punitive awards as a separate class of income.
State allocation might also function as an excise tax, that is, a tax on the event of
recovering a punitive award. Again, uniformity clauses would require uniformity within classes,
and a reasonableness standard would apply. Id. Categorization as an excise tax would raise
additional problems, however, because many state constitutions have provisions mandating
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however, the government's interest attaches prior to or simultaneously with

the entry of judgment, it appears that the government becomes a judgment
creditor of the defendant, with a property right in its share enforceable
against the defendant. 19 Under that approach, the government's allocation
resembles a civil penalty. 20

of a portion of the award

This Note analyzes state allocation in light of these differing approaches.

The constitutional analysis of Part II begins with a discussion of Takings
Clause issues presented by the former "appropriation"

approach. This

section suggests some flaws in that approach and some reasons why courts
might mistakenly adopt it. Part II then examines the criminal law protections

embodied in the Excessive Fines and Double Jeopardy Clauses and evoked
by the latter "civil penalty" approach. Next, Part III argues for specific
statutory adoption of the civil penalty approach and discusses the practice
and policy issues that that approach presents. Finally, an Appendix cites

and summarizes each state allocation statute.
II.

CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES

In a series of recent cases, the Supreme Court has considered the
constitutionality of traditional punitive damage awards in private civil
litigation. 21 Those cases culminated in the 1991 decision in Pacific Mutual

that justice be administered without "sale, denial or delay." E.g., COLO. CONST. art. II, § 6;
FLA. CONST. of 1968, art. I, § 21. A tax on the recovery of damages might constitute "sale"
in violation of those provisions.
A court that categorized existing state allocation statutes as taxes might invalidate them
per se. Most state constitutions include clauses limiting each bill to one subject, and holding
void any subject not included in the title. E.g., CoLo. CONST. art. V, § 21; GA. CONST. art.
III, § 7, para. 4; IDAHO CONST. art. 3, § 16; IND. CONST. art. 4, § 19; MICH. CONST. art IV,
§ 24. State allocation statutes arise in code sections dealing with torts or civil procedure. If
the state legislature passed them as bills under those titles, the allocation sections may be void
as taxes. See McBride v. General Motors Corp., 737 F. Supp. 1563, 1578 (M.D. Ga. 1990)
-(holding Georgia allocation statute unconstitutional under Georgia constitutional provision
limiting bills to one subject).
19. See GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(2) (Michie 1987) ("Upon issuance of judgment in
[an allocation] case, the state shall have all rights due a judgment creditor ... and shall stand
on equal footing with the plaintiff .....
20. See International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S.42, 48 (1979) (analogizing
punitive awards to private fines).
21. See Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 281 (1989)
(denying constitutional challenge to punitive damages); Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v.
Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71, 78 (1988) (same); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 828
(1986) (same). In Browning-Ferristhe Supreme Court held that the Excessive Fines Clause of
the Eighth Amendment does not apply to punitive damage awards. Browning-Ferris,492 U.S.
at 275. The Court refused to hear a due process challenge because the appellant had not raised
that issue in either the district court or appellate court. Id. at 277. In Crenshaw the Court
similarly failed to reach a due process challenge to a punitive award because that issue had
not been raised in state court. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. at 78. In Lavoie due process and Eighth
Amendment challenges were properly raised, but the Court did not reach those challenges
because its resolution of another issue made resolution of those constitutional issues unnecessary. Lavoie, 475 U.S. at 828.
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Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip,22 in which the Court announced its boldest
2
affirmation yet of the common-law method of assessing punitive damages.

Coupled with the decision in Browning-Ferris Industries, Inc. v. Kelco
Disposal, Inc.,24 in which the Court held that the Eighth Amendment
Excessive Fines Clause does not apply to punitive damages, 25 Haslip firmly
established the constitutionality of traditional punitive damage awards. 26
However, these decisions did not address situations in which the government
receives part of a punitive damage award.

The government's entry into the litigation, either as an appropriator of
the plaintiff's award or as a judgment creditor of the defendant, may alter
the character of the proceeding to such a degree that a previously acceptable

practice could become constitutionally suspect. 27 The predominant challenges

22. I11 S. Ct. 1032 (1991).
23. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 111 S. Ct. 1032 (1991). In Haslip a group of
insureds sued their insurer alleging fraud. Id. at 1036. The jury found for the plaintiffs and
awarded damages, including a punitive award of four times the amount of compensatory
damages. Id. at 1037. The Supreme Court held that the punitive damage award did not violate
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 1044. The Court cautioned that
unlimited jury or judicial discretion in fixing awards could raise the possibility that extreme
awards might violate due process. Id. at 1043. However, the Court specified that the procedural
protections used by the Alabama court in the case at bar vindicated due process. Id. at 104546.
24. 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
25. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 260 (1989). See
infra notes 195-297 and accompanying text (discussing holding in Browning-Ferris).
26. By approving the Alabama courts' procedures for assessing and reviewing awards,
the Haslip Court implicitly established a standard for evaluating state methods of awarding
traditional punitive damages. Haslip, 111 S. Ct. at 1044-46. The Haslip Court noted with
approval the jury instructions, the trial court's post-trial review, and the appellate review as
methods of protecting the due process rights of punitive damages defendants. Id. The Court
stressed that the jury instructions properly informed the jury that the purpose of punitive
damages was retributive and deterrent and that the award of punitive damages was not
compulsory. Id. at 1044. The Court then commended the procedures for post-trial review laid
out by the Alabama Supreme Court in Hammond v. City of Gadsden, 493 So. 2d 1374, 1379
(Ala. 1986). Haslip, 111 S. Ct. at 1044. The "Hammond test," as expanded by the Alabama
Supreme Court in subsequent cases, provides for consideration of: (1) the relationship between
the punitive award and the harm, both actual and potential, resulting from the defendant's
conduct; (2) the reprehensibility and duration of the conduct and the defendant's culpability
for the conduct; (3) the profitability of the conduct; (4) the defendant's financial position; (5)
the costs of litigation; (6) the imposition of criminal sanctions; and (7) the imposition of other
civil awards. Id. at 1044-45. Finally, the Supreme Court recognized Alabama's procedures for
appellate review, which require the higher courts to ensure that punitive awards do not exceed
the amount necessary to achieve society's goals. Id. at 1045.
27. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634 (1986) (noting that civil proceeding
may operate in "substance and effect" as criminal proceeding, thereby triggering criminal law
procedural due process protections). In Haslip the Supreme Court affirmed against a due
process challenge the general common-law method for assessing punitive damages in civil cases
between private parties. I11 S. Ct. at 1044. Because the government's entry into the litigation
as a recipient of a punitive award gives a proceeding a more criminal flavor, state allocation
may further implicate due process. See infra part II.B-C (discussing analogy of state allocation
to criminal punishment). Analogous civil actions may provide insight into the level of process
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to state allocation to date have rested on Fifth Amendment Takings Clause
grounds. In addition, in Browning-Ferris, the Supreme Court specifically
held open the possibility that punitive damage awards might violate the
Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment if the government were a
2 9 the Supreme
party to the action. 2 Finally, in United States v. Halper,

Court suggested that punitive awards could violate the Double Jeopardy

Clause of the Fifth Amendment if the government were a party to the
action.3 0
A.

The Takings Clause

The Fifth Amendment prohibits the government from taking private
property for public use without just compensation. 3 Challenges to state
allocation have rested primarily on the ground that under these statutes,
the state government takes the plaintiff's property-her punitive damage

award-in violation of the Fifth Amendment.12 Plaintiffs have raised Fifth

required to "provide fundamentally fair proceedings" when the government appropriates a
share of a punitive award. See Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 24 (1981)
(defining procedural due process fairness requirements).
In United States v. Hooker Chem. & Plastics Corp., 748 F. Supp. 67 (W.D.N.Y. 1990),
a United States district court held that the state of New York constitutionally could recover
punitive damages on a public nuisance claim under the common-law standard for assessing
punitive damages. Id. The court found that the standard was not unconstitutionally vague in
violation of due process. Id. at 78. In other cases, courts have allowed legislatures considerable
leeway to assess civil penalties when statutory guidelines determine those penalties. See, e.g.,
Toledo, Columbus & Ohio River R.R. v. Miller, 140 N.E. 617, 621 (Ohio 1923) (upholding
ordinance imposing civil fine for speeding trains because no imprisonment or criminal proceeding). State allocation probably will survive due process challenges at least in states in
which the statute provides a limit on damages or a method for determining damages. State
allocation may survive in any event since the Supreme Court has determined that existing
common-law methods generally provide enough protection in cases solely between private
parties. Haslip, 111 S. Ct. at 1045.
In regard to the substantive component of due process, state allocation rests on an even
stronger footing. The state must show only that its receipt of a portion of an award rationally
serves a legitimate governmental purpose. In Gordon v. State the Florida Supreme Court held
that Florida's allocation statute does not violate substantive due process because the statute
"bears a rational relation to legitimate legislative objectives." Gordon v. State, 608 So. 2d
800, 802 (Fla. 1992), cert. denied, 61 U.S.L.W. 3568 (U.S. Mar. 29, 1993) (No. 92-1328). The
Gordon court found that the state had a legitimate objective "to allot to the public weal a
portion of damages designed to deter future harm to the public and to discourage punitive
damage claims by making them less remunerative to the claimant and the'claimant's attorney."
Id. Generally, a demonstration of that sort of state interest will satisfy substantive due process.
But see McBride v. General Motors Corp., 737 F. Supp. 1563, 1579 (M.D. Ga. 1990) (holding
Georgia allocation statute violates several constitutional provisions including due process).
28. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 275 n.21 (1989).
29. 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
30. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989). See infra notes 58-65 and accompanying
text (analyzing Halper).
31. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
32. In addition to prohibiting takings, the Fifth Amendment also prohibits the government
from depriving a person of property without due process of law. The decisions in Gordon v.
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Amendment challenges in three states: Colorado,33 Florida,3 4 and Iowa."
Of these challenges, only the one in Colorado succeeded.
The delineation of "property" lies at the core of Takings Clause
jurisprudence.16 In the context of state allocation, the key determination is
the point at which a punitive damage award becomes property of the
plaintiff. A person generally has a "right" to redress for a legally recognizable injury in the form of compensatory damages. 37 Many state constitutions guarantee this right. 38 In some states the right to redress exists only
at common law. 39 Courts frequently characterize this right, which is really
just a cause of action, 4° as property. 41 Logically, if a person has a right to

State, 608 So. 2d 800 (Fla. 1992), cert. denied, 61 U.S.L.W. 3568 (U.S. Mar. 29, 1993) (No.
92-1328), and Shepherd Components, Inc. v. Brice Petrides-Donohue & Assocs., Inc., 473
N.W.2d 612 (Iowa 1991), do not expressly differentiate between these two prohibitions. Both
courts only peripherally addressed the Fifth Amendment because they concluded that the
plaintiff had no property interest in the share of the punitive award that the state received.
Shepherd, 473 N.W.2d at 619; Gordon, 608 So. 2d at 801. Had the courts concluded that the
plaintiff did have a protected property interest, the Takings Clause, rather than the Due
Process Clause, would have provided the primary basis for attacking the government's
allocation. See Gordon, 608 So. 2d at 803 (Shaw, J., dissenting) (arguing that plaintiff has
property interest and state takes that interest without just compensation). For that reason, this
Note treats these cases as Takings Clause cases.
33. See Kirk v. Denver Publishing Co., 818 P.2d 262, 265 (Colo. 1991) (holding Colorado
allocation statute unconstitutional under Takings Clause). The plaintiff in Kirk challenged the
Colorado state allocation statute under the Takings Clauses of both the United States and
Colorado constitutions. Id.
34. See Gordon, 608 So. 2d at 801 (holding Florida allocation statute does not effect
unconstitutional taking).
35. See Shepherd, 473 N.W.2d at 619 (Iowa 1991) (holding that Iowa allocation statute
does not effect unconstitutional taking).
36. See generally Frank 1. Michelman, Property as a ConstitutionalRight, 38 WASH. &
LEE L. Rav. 1097 (1981) (discussing types of property rights protected by Takings Clause).
37. See Barbara A. v. John G., 193 Cal. Rptr. 422, 427 (Ct. App. 1983) (noting that
every legal wrong has remedy, and injured party should be compensated for all damage
proximately caused by wrongdoer); see also MARILYN MINZER ET AL., DAMAGES iN TORT
AcnONS § 1.02 (1991) (discussing general considerations behind common-law compensatory
damages).
38. E.g., CoLo. CONST. art. II, § 6 ("Courts of justice shall be open to every person,
and a speedy remedy afforded for every injury to person, property or character; and right
and justice should be administered without sale, denial or delay."); F-A. CONST. of 1968, art.
I, § 21 ("The courts shall be open to every person for redress of any injury, and justice shall
be administered without sale, denial or delay.").
39. See Powell v. Ward, 643 F.2d 924, 934 (2d Cir.) (stating that award of damages
may not be withheld when actual injury is established), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 832 (1981).
40. See Woodfork v. Marine Cooks & Stewards Union, 642 F.2d 966, 971 (5th Cir.
1981) (stating that cause of action is state of facts which entitle person to sustain action and
seek judicial remedy); Porter v. Household Fin. Corp., 385 F. Supp. 336, 344 (S.D. Ohio
1974) (noting that cause of action includes right to recover damages for tort as well as breach
of contract).
41. See, e.g., Rosane v. Senger, 149 P.2d 372, 375 (Colo. 1944) (stating that right to
recover damages is property); O'Grady v. Potts, 396 P.2d 285, 289 (Kan. 1964) (stating that
cause of action for tortious injury is personal property); Garrett v. Reno Oil Co., 271 S.W.2d
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compensatory damages after suffering an injury, and this right is property,
the person must have a property right in the damages even before the entry
of judgment. 42 If this is the case, the state would effect a taking if it
43
appropriated a share of a compensatory award at any time.
In contrast to the right to compensatory damages, a person generally
does not have a right to punitive damages."4 Instead, many states allow a
plaintiff to ask for punitive damages, after showing an actual injury, 4 in
certain circumstances determined either by statute or by common law." This

764, 767 (Tex. Ct. App. 1954) (stating that right to recover damages for personal injuries is
property right); see also Creighton v. Pope County, 50 N.E.2d 984, 987 (Ill. App. Ct. 1943)
(stating that vested right of action is property in same sense in which tangible things are
property); Kuhn v. Kuhn, 389 N.E.2d 319, 320 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979) (stating that choses in
action are personalty); Mueller v. Rupp, 761 P.2d 62, 66 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988) (stating that
chose in action is property).
42. Cf. Capital Nat'l Bank v. McDonald's Corp., 625 F. Supp. 874, 879 (S.D.N.Y.
1986) ("A portion of an expected recovery is ... assignable as [personal property].").
43. See GmHARo & KIRCHER, supra note 3, §§ 4.02-.06 (noting confusion in some states
about compensatory or punitive nature of awards). Connecticut, Michigan, and New Hampshire
allow recovery of awards above actual damages, but treat these awards as compensatory. Id.
In these states an effort by the legislature to recover a portion of such an "aggravated" award
prior to entry of judgment could violate the Takings Clause if the plaintiff actually has a preexisting property right in a compensatory award. That question is most likely to arise in
Georgia, which has a state allocation statute. GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(2) (Michie 1987).
Georgia at one time treated aggravated damages as at least partially compensatory. See GHLARDI
& KIRCHER, supra note 3, § 4.04 (discussing history of Georgia punitive damages). The
legislature amended the code in 1987 to specify that punitive damages do not serve a
compensatory purpose. Id. § 4.04 (1991 Supp.). However, that amendment only applies to
causes of action arising after July 1, 1987. Id. An attempt to apply the state allocation statute
to a case involving a cause of action arising prior to that date might evoke Takings Clause
questions.
Similar questions could arise in any state that does not explicitly provide, either by statute
or in case law, that punitive damages serve purely retributive and deterrent functions. Some
commentators have argued that punitive damages in fact serve the compensatory end of
restitution for wounded dignity, mental anguish, or other intangible harms. See KNN=a
R.
REDDEN, PuNrTIvE DAmAGns §§ 2.2.B-.C (1980) (discussing conflicting views of purpose of
punitive damages). Some case law supports that interpretation. See, e.g., Stuart v. Western
Union Tel. Co., 18 S.W. 351, 353 (Tex. 1885) (arguing that punitive damages serve partly
compensatory ends). If a court finds that punitive damages in fact serve compensatory ends,
it might also find that a plaintiff has a pre-existing property right in a punitive award.
44. See Seaward Constr. Co. v. Bradley, 817 P.2d 971, 975 (Colo. 1991) (holding that
plaintiff has no right to punitive damages unless and until trier of fact awards them); DA B.
DoBas, LAW OF REMEDIES § 3.9 (1973) (noting that punitive damages are not given as of right
in any state).
45. See Oliver v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 799 F.2d 95, 97 (3d Cir. 1986) (noting prerequisite
of actual damages for recovery of punitive damages); Brech v. J.C. Penney Co., 698 F.2d
332, 336 (8th Cir. 1983) (same); GnIARDI & KIRcHmR, supra note 3, § 6.16 (same).
46. See GmA.Di & KmcHER, supra note 3, § 5.01 (discussing general principles behind
punitive damages). Generally, in order to recover punitive damages, a plaintiff must show
some level of scienter on the part of the defendant. Id. States vary widely on the level of
scienter required. Typically plaintiffs must show "malice," "willful and wanton conduct,"
"fraud," or "reckless disregard." Id.
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limited "right" to sue for punitive damages is not property.47 Logically,
then, the plaintiff has no property right in a punitive award prior to entry
of judgment. 48 Thus, the Takings Clause can apply to state allocation of
punitive damages only if the state takes its share subsequent to entry of
49
judgment.
In Kirk v. Denver Publishing Co.,SO the Colorado Supreme Court held
that Colorado's punitive damages allocation statute violated the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 5 In resolving the issue of when the
government's interest attached, the court emphasized a provision of the
statute that disavowed any interest on the part of the state in the damages
or in the litigation prior to "payment becoming due. ' 5 2 The court interpreted
this provision to mean that the entire award vested in the plaintiff, and
that the government had no interest in the award until after the entry of
5
the judgment.

3

47. See Ross v. Gore, 48 So. 2d 412, 414 (Fla. 1950) (stating that right to punitive
damages is not property); Osborn v. Leach, 47 S.E. 811, 813 (N.C. 1904) (same). Few courts
have ruled on the question of property rights in punitive damages, probably because it is
accepted that a plaintiff has no right to receive punitive damages until the jury awards them.
See supra note 44 (noting that plaintiff has no right to receive punitive award).
48. See Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Street, 51 So. 306, 307 (Ala. 1909) (holding
plaintiff has no property right in expected punitive award); Smith v. Hill, 147 N.E.2d 321,
325 (Ill. 1958) (same).
49. See Smith, 147 N.E.2d at 325 (holding plaintiff has no property right in expected
punitive award). But see supra note 43 (discussing confusion over punitive or compensatory
nature of aggravated awards in some states).
50. 818 P.2d 262 (Colo. 1991).
51. Kirk v. Denver Publishing Co., 818 P.2d 262, 265 (Colo. 1991). In Kirk, the plaintiff,
Kirk, distributed newspapers published by the defendant, Denver Publishing Company (DPC).
Id. at 264. When their relationship ended, DPC filed suit alleging that Kirk had not paid a
balance due. Id. Kirk countersued alleging breach of contract and received substantial actual
and punitive damages. Id. After entry of judgment, Kirk filed a post-trial motion requesting
the district court to invalidate the Colorado statute requiring him to pay one-third of the
punitive damage award to the state. Id. The district court denied the motion, and Kirk appealed
claiming the statute violated the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment and other provisions
of the United States and Colorado Constitutions. Id.
52. See CoLo. REv. STAT. Am. § 13-21-102(4) (West 1987) ("Nothing in this subsection
(4) shall be construed to give the general fund any interest in the claim for exemplary damages
or in the litigation itself at any time prior to payment becoming due."). Both the Colorado
statute and the Colorado Supreme Court refer not to "punitive damages" but to "exemplary
damages." These terms are interchangeable. See RicHARD L. BLArr ET AL., PUN=rw DAtOEs
§ 1.3(A)(1) (1991) (noting no difference in legal meaning between terms "punitive damages"
and "exemplary damages").
53. Kirk, 818 P.2d at 267. The court apparently concluded that the judgment for punitive
damages vested in its entirety and that the statute acted to disturb that judgment. Id. at 268.
The court stated that "[w]here a private property interest emanates directly from a final
judgment, ... such a property interest cannot be diminished by legislative fiat ...." Id.
In his dissent, Chief Justice Rovira partially addressed the majority's inference that the
statute acted to disturb an existing judgment. Id. at 274. He argued that the entire award
never vested in the plaintiff because the plaintiff could receive no more than the statute
granted. Id. at 275. He noted that although the state could not modify an existing judgment,
it could condition damages the right to which existed only through a statutory grant. Id.
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Having found that the government's interest attached after the entry of
judgment, the court addressed the question of whether the judgment constituted property. The court found that a judgment for punitive damages is
property, stating that "[b]ecause the term 'property' includes a 'legal right
to damage for an injury,' it necessarily follows that the term 'property'
also includes the judgment itself. ' " From this analysis, the court concluded
that the plaintiff had a property right in the punitive damages before the
government's interest attached.55
The Kirk court next addressed whether the state had "taken" the
plaintiff's property in violation of the Fifth Amendment. 6 In determining
when a state appropriation of a money judgment constitutes a taking, the
court relied on the United States Supreme Court's decision in United States
v. Sperry Corp.57 In Sperry the Supreme Court found that a one and onehalf percent deduction from an arbitration award did not constitute a taking
under the Fifth Amendment because that deduction was a reasonable user
fee.5 8 The Colorado Supreme Court interpreted Sperry to require that any
such appropriation of a judgment bear a reasonable relationship to the
government services provided.5 9 The Colorado court determined that the
statute at issue in Kirk failed that test, and therefore effected a taking,
because the statute appropriated a percentage too great to qualify as a valid
property tax, excise tax, or user fee. 60
Chief Justice Rovira dissented in Kirk.61 He focused on the majority's
characterization of the entire judgment as a vested property interest. 62 He
stated that "a claim for [punitive] damages is a statutory right which may
be conditioned by the legislature and thus the entire judgment never vested
in the plaintiff. ' 63 He reasoned further that, because the legislature could
abolish punitive damages entirely, it could place conditions on their recovery. 64 He argued that the plaintiff knew of those conditions and thus took

54. Id. at 267 (quoting Rosane v. Senger, 149 P.2d 372, 375 (Colo. 1944)).
55. Id.
56. Id.

57. 493 U.S. 52 (1989).
58. United States v. Sperry Corp., 493 U.S. 52, 62 (1989). In Sperry, a federal statute
required the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to deduct one and one-half percent from the
first five million dollars of an arbitration award entered by the Iran-United States Claims
Tribunal. Id. at 54. The purpose of the provision was to reimburse the government for the
administrative costs of the arbitration procedure. Id. at 57. The Supreme Court held that the
statute did not effect an unlawful taking under the Fifth Amendment because it constituted a

valid user fee. Id. at 62.
59. Kirk v. Denver Publishing Co., 818 P.2d 262, 270 (Colo. 1991).
60. Id. at 270-72; see supra note 18 (discussing implications of categorizing state allocation

as tax).
61. Kirk, 818 P.2d at 273 (Rovira, C.J., dissenting). One other justice joined Chief
Justice Rovira in his dissent.
62. Id. at 274.

63. Id.
64. Id.
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the punitive award subject to them. 65 Finally, he concluded that the plaintiff

received a property interest only in the one-third share of the award that
the statute allocated to him, and that, therefore, the state could not have

taken his property. 6
Courts in other states have reached conclusions similar to Chief Justice
Rovira's. In Shepherd Components, Inc. v. Brice Petrides-Donohue &
Associates, Inc., 67 the Iowa Supreme Court rejected a Fifth Amendment
challenge to the Iowa punitive damages allocation statute. 61 In Shepherd, a
building owner whose building partially collapsed during excavation of a
sewer brought suit against the engineering firm and excavating contractor
performing the project. 69 The jury awarded the building owner compensatory
and punitive damages, and the trial court allocated seventy-five percent of
the punitive award to the state in keeping with Iowa's state allocation

statute. 70 The building owner appealed claiming the allocation statute unconstitutionally deprived him of his property. 1 In an extremely cursory
analysis, the Iowa Supreme Court found that the state took its share before

the plaintiff had any vested right in the damages, and that therefore the
statute did not violate the Fifth Amendment. 72
In Gordon v. State,73 the Florida Supreme Court rejected a Fifth
Amendment challenge to the Florida state allocation statute.7 4 Like the Iowa
statute, the Florida statute did not mention at what point the state took its

65. Id at 275.
66. Id.
67. 473 N.W.2d 612 (Iowa 1991).
68. Shepherd Components, Inc. v. Brice Petrides-Donohue & Assocs., Inc., 473 N.W.2d
612, 619 (Iowa 1991). The Iowa court couched its decision in due process rather than takings
language. However, its resolution of the property interest question speaks equally to Takings
Clause as to Due Process Clause challenges.
69. Id. at 614.
70. Id. The Iowa state allocation statute diverts to the state's Civil Reparations Trust
Fund 75% of every punitive damage award in cases in which the defendant's conduct was not
aimed specifically at the plaintiff. IOWA CODE ANN. § 668A.1 (West 1987).
71. Shepherd, 473 N.W.2d at 614.
72. Id. at 619. The Iowa statute contains no provision like the one in the Colorado
statute disavowing the state's interest until "payment becomes due." See infra Appendix (citing
and describing state allocation statutes); see also supra note 53 and accompanying text
(discussing Kirk court's analysis of Colorado disavowal provision).
73. 608 So. 2d 800 (Fla. 1992), cert. denied, 61 U.S.L.W. 3568 (U.S. Mar. 29, 1993)
(No. 92-1328).

74. Gordon v. State, 608 So. 2d 800, 802 (Fla. 1992), cert. denied, 61 U.S.L.W. 3568
(U.S. Mar. 29, 1993) (No. 92-1328). The Florida Supreme Court never specifically discussed
the Takings Clause. It focused on due process, and also denied challenges based on equal
protection, the right to trial by jury, and several state constitutional provisions. Id. The dissent
did specifically address the takings issue. Id. at 803 (Shaw, J., dissenting). Leaning for support
on the Colorado Supreme Court's decision in Kirk v. Denver Publishing Co., 818 P.2d 262
(Colo. 1991), the dissent argued that the plaintiff had a vested property right before the state
intervened and that therefore the statute effected an unconstitutional taking. Gordon, 608 So.
2d at 802-04 (Shaw, J., dissenting).
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interest." The statute provided only that the state's portion of the award
"shall be payable" to the state. 76 The Florida court found that the plaintiff
77
had no property interest in the full award.
The Gordon court emphasized that the legislature has the power to
condition or even abolish punitive damages, and that a plaintiff has no
vested property right in a punitive award prior to entry of judgment. 78 The
plaintiff receives a property interest in the award because of the allocation
statute. 79 The court reasoned that, because the legislature created the plaintiff's property right in the award, and the legislature placed a condition on
the recovery of that award, the plaintiff took the award subject to the
allocation condition. 0 Therefore, the court implicitly held that the plaintiff
received no property interest in the portion of the award allocated to the
8s
government .

The dissent in Kirk and the majorities in Shepherd and Gordon share
the approach that the state's interest arises prior to or simultaneously with
the plaintiff's.12 These opinions emphasize that the plaintiff has no property
right in a punitive damage award prior to entry of judgment, and that the
plaintiff receives any property interest only due to the statute.8 3 The opinions

75. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73 (West 1986); see infra Appendix (citing and describing
state allocation statutes).
76. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73 (West 1986).
77. Gordon, 608 So. 2d at 801.
78. Id. Gordon was a per curiam decision. The Fifth Amendment portion of the decision
consists almost entirely of two quotes, one from the appellate court's decision, 585 So. 2d
1033, 1035-36 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991), and one from a prior Florida Supreme Court
decision. See Ross v. Gore, 48 So. 2d 412, 414 (Fla. 1950) (holding that right to punitive
damages is not property). Other than citing these quotes with approval, the Supreme Court
did no analysis of its own. Gordon, 608 So. 2d at 801.
79. Gordon, 608 So. 2d at 801.
80. Id.
81. Id. The appellate decision contains a more detailed discussion of the property issue
and thus may be more illuminating than the Supreme Court decision. The appellate court
stated that "[w]here an existing statute provides that funds recovered under it are subject to
a prior claim, a party cannot thereafter obtain a vested right to that claim." Gordon, 585 So.
2d at 1036. In effect then, the appellate court did not conclude that the state took its share
of the award before the plaintiff took his. Cf. Shepherd Components, Inc. v. Brice PetridesDonohue & Assocs., Inc., 473 N.W.2d 612 (Iowa 1991) (holding plaintiff received vested
interest at entry of judgment only in share allocated to him). Instead, the appellate court
concluded that the plaintiff took the entire award subject to the state's prior claim. See Kirk
v. Denver Publishing Co., 818 P.2d 262, 275 n.2 (Colo. 1991) (Rovira, C.J., dissenting)
(analyzing characterizations of plaintiff's property interest in award). In a footnote to his
dissent in Kirk, Chief Justice Rovira recognized that the transaction could be seen as the
plaintiff taking the entire award subject to the state's prior claim. Id. He stated that "[e]xpressed
alternatively, a plaintiff's property right in a judgment for punitive damages is intrinsically
subject to partial defeasance upon collection ....

."

Id.

82. Kirk, 818 P.2d at 275; Shepherd, 473 N.W.2d at 619; Gordon v. State, 608 So. 2d
800, 801 (Fla. 1992), cert. denied, 61 U.S.L.W. 3568 (U.S. Mar. 29, 1993) (No. 92-1328).
83. See Kirk, 818 P.2d at 274 (Rovira, C.J., dissenting) (stating that legislature can
condition recovery of punitive damages); Gordon, 608 So. 2d at 801 (same). These opinions
intimate that the legislature has virtually unlimited power to condition the recovery of punitive
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argue, either implicitly or explicitly, that the statute grants the plaintiff a
limited "right" to request punitive damages, but subjects any such award
to a prior claim by the state. 4 Because, under this rationale, the plaintiff
receives his property interest after the government takes its, this approach
insulates state allocation from Takings Clause challenges.
The Kirk majority held the Colorado statute unconstitutional largely on
the basis of the statute's provision disavowing any government interest in
the litigation or the punitive award until "payment becom[es] due." 8 The
court interpreted that provision to vest the entire punitive award in the
plaintiff before any government interest attached. 6 Any interpretation that
gives the plaintiff a property interest in the entire award before the government takes its share likely will doom state allocation on Takings Clause
grounds.Y However, the disavowal provision of the Colorado statute is
unique among state allocation statutes.88 In the absence of that type of
ambiguous and misleading language, courts probably will adopt the approach of the Shepherd and Gordon courts. 9

awards. In fact, some questions may arise about the exact power of state legislatures to abridge
common-law "rights" and causes of action. The Colorado Constitution guarantees every
person "a speedy remedy afforded for every injury to person, property or character." CoLO.
CONST., art. II, § 6. Courts have held that this section does not prevent the legislature from
changing laws which create rights, O'Quinn v. Walt Disney Prods., Inc., 493 P.2d 344 (Colo.
1972), and does not preserve pre-existing common-law remedies from legislative change.
Shoemaker v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 559 P.2d 721 (Colo. Ct. App. 1976). In other
states, the constitutional requirements may vary. For example, the Florida constitution guarantees every person "redress of any injury." FLA. CONST. of 1968, art. I, § 21. Florida courts
have interpreted this clause to prohibit the legislature from altering a common-law cause of
action unless a substitute remedy exists. Johnson v. R.H. Donnelly Co., 402 So. 2d 518 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1981). However, courts have held that no substitute remedy is required where
legislation reduces but does not destroy a cause of action. Alterman Transp. Lines, Inc. v.
State, 405 So. 2d 456 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
84. Kirk, 818 P.2d at 275; Shepherd, 473 N.W.2d at 619; Gordon, 608 So. 2d at 801;
see United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Department of Ins., 453 So. 2d 1355, 1361 (Fla.
1984) (holding that plaintiff gets no vested right to entire award if award is subject to prior
claim). U.S. Fidelityinvolved a statute that provided that insurers had to return to policyholders
all profits in excess of 5%. Id. at 1357-58. The Florida Supreme Court held that when a
statute provides that a percentage of the money recovered under it is subject to a prior claim
in the form of a refund order, the recipient does not get a vested right to the excess. Id. at
1361.
85. Kirk, 818 P.2d at 267; see COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-102(4) (West 1987)
(disavowing state's interest in litigation). Although the Florida allocation statute has no such
disavowal provision, the dissent in Gordon v. State, 608 So. 2d 800 (Fla. 1992), argued for
adoption of the Kirk court's approach. Gordon, 608 So. 2d at 803. The Gordon dissent,
apparently arguing from a policy perspective, emphasized that the state had done nothing to
earn its share of the award. Id.
86. Kirk v. Denver Publishing Co., 818 P.2d 262, 272-73 (Colo. 1991).
87. See Gordon v. State, 608 So. 2d 800, 803 (Fla. 1992) (Shaw, J., dissenting) (arguing
for adoption of Kirk approach and invalidation of allocation statute).
88. See infra Appendix (citing and describing state allocation statutes).
89. See, e.g., McBride v. General Motors Corp., 737 F. Supp. 1563 (M.D. Ga. 1990).
In McBride a federal district court held the Georgia allocation statute unconstitutional on
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The Excessive Fines Clause

While it insulates state allocation from Takings Clause challenges, the

civil penalty approach raises other constitutional questions.9 Under that
approach, the government recovers a share of a punitive award against a
civil defendant. The recovery by the government of a punitive award may

implicate several constitutional provisions designed to protect individuals
from arbitrary government punishments. Foremost among these is the Eighth

Amendment's prohibition of excessive fines. 91
The Excessive Fines Clause has virtually no history of application.Y As
a result, its position in American jurisprudence is the subject of substantial

several grounds, but never mentionea the property rights of the plaintiff in the award. The
Georgia statute gives the state the rights of a judgment creditor on an equal footing with the
plaintiff. GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(2) (Michie 1987).
90. No matter what approach to the property issue a court takes, state allocation could
raise Equal Protection Clause questions if the statute gives the government a share of the
award only in certain cases. See GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(2) (Michie 1987) (giving state
75% of punitive awards in products liability actions only); IowA CODE ANN. § 668A.1 (West
1987) (giving state 75% of punitive awards in cases in which defendant's conduct was not
aimed specifically at plaintiff); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3402 (1987) (giving state 50% of punitive
awards in medical malpractice cases only).
In McBride v. General Motors Corp., 737 F. Supp. 1563 (M.D. Ga. 1990), a federal
district court held that the Georgia allocation statute violates the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 1569. The court held that the statute discriminates on its
face between products liability plaintiffs and other tort plaintiffs. Id. The court found that
the statute does not rationally further the state's purported interest in raising revenue because
the court found no reason to divert awards from products liability plaintiffs only, instead of
from all tort plaintiffs. Id. at 1569-70. The court also noted due process, excessive fines, and
double jeopardy infringements in striking down the statute. Id. at 1579.
McBride represents a shocking aberration from accepted equal protection jurisprudence.
Unless the class being discriminated against is a suspect or quasi-suspect class, a category
which certainly does not include product liability plaintiffs, the state need show only a rational
basis for the different treatment of that class. See JOHN E. NowAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA,
CONsrnorrONAL LAW § 14.3 (4th ed. 1991) (summarizing equal protection analysis). Traditionally, under the rational basis test of a state's interest, courts have given almost unlimited
deference to the judgment of the state legislature. E.g., Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v.
Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976). The decision in McBride, therefore, may have little or no
precedential value.
Equal protection questions can also arise if a classification burdens a fundamental right.
See NOwAK & ROTUNDA, supra, § 14.3 (summarizing equal protection analysis). Plaintiffs
might argue that state allocation denies them the fundamental right to recover a punitive
award. However, these challenges seem unlikely to succeed given the wide latitude that states
have to alter and abridge common-law causes of action. See supra note 83 (discussing power
of legislatures to alter causes of action).
91. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VIII. The Eighth Amendment provides that "[e]xcessive bail
shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."
Id.
92. See Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 262 (1989)
(noting that Supreme Court has never considered case applying Excessive Fines Clause); Robert
B. Dunham, The Cruel and Unusual Punishment and Excessive Fines Clauses, 26 AM. CP..
L. Rzv. 1617, 1617 (1989) (stating that "the 'excessive fines' clause has been moribund").
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controversy. 9 Commentators have argued about many facets of the clause,
including the application of the clause in contexts other than traditional
criminal prosecutions, the application of the clause to the states through
the Fourteenth Amendment, and the proper measure of excessiveness. 94 Each

of these questions must enter the equation in analyzing the applicability of
the Excessive Fines Clause to state allocation of punitive damages.
The Supreme Court resolved some of these questions in its 1989 decision

in Browning-FerrisIndustries, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.95 The Court held
that the Excessive Fines Clause does not apply to punitive damage awards

in civil cases between private parties. 96 Still, the Court specifically left
unresolved many of the ambiguities surrounding the relationship of the
clause to punitive damages. The Court said, "we now decide only that [the

Excessive Fines Clause] does not constrain an award of money damages in
a civil suit when the government neither has prosecuted the action nor has

any right to receive a share of the damages awarded."

As a result of the

Supreme Court's reticence, questions remain about whether the government's

involvement in the litigation implicates the clause, whether the clause applies
to the states, and the appropriate measure of excessiveness.
In concluding that the punitive award at issue did not implicate the
Eighth Amendment, the Browning-FerrisCourt distinctly implied that if the

government had received a share of the award, the Excessive Fines Clause
would apply. The Court said that "[h]ere the government of Vermont has
not ...

used the civil courts to extract large payments or forfeitures for

the purpose of raising revenue or disabling some individual." 98 Under a
state allocation scheme, the state does use the courts to extract payments

93. See generally Lyndon F. Bittle, Comment, Punitive Damages and the Eighth Amendment: An Analytical Frameworkfor Determining Excessiveness, 75 CAL. L. Ra,. 1433 (1987)
(analyzing possible methods of determining excessiveness); Dunham, supra note 92 (discussing
conflicting interpretations of Excessive Fines Clause); Calvin R. Massey, The Excessive Fines
Clause and Punitive Damages: Some Lessons From History, 40 VAiN. L. Rav. 1233 (1987)
(arguing that Excessive Fines Clause has been misconstrued to apply only in criminal actions).
94. See, e.g., Massey, supra note 93, at 127(173 (arguing that Excessive Fines Clause
should apply to punitive damages). Professor Massey, writing before Browning-Ferris,argued
that the Excessive Fines Clause applies to civil as well as criminal penalties, that the clause
applies to the states, and that the clause requires statutory limits on the size of awards. Id.
95. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989). In
Browning-Ferristwo waste disposal companies competed for business in Burlington, Vermont.
Id. at 260-61. Browning-Ferris attempted to put Kelco out of business by waging a price war.
Id. Kelco brought suit alleging violations of the Sherman Act and violations of Vermont
contract and tort law. Id. at 261. The jury found for Kelco and awarded substantial
compensatory damages and $6 million in punitive damages. Id. at 262. Browning-Ferris
appealed, claiming the punitive award violated the Excessive Fines Clause. Id. at 262. The
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that even if the Excessive Fines Clause applied,
the punitive award was not excessive. Id.
96. Id. at 260.
97. Id. at 264.
98. Id. at 275.
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for the purpose of raising revenue or disabling an individual. In her dissent,
Justice O'Connor recognized the implication of the majority's argument.
She used the Florida allocation statute as an example of a government
recovery of an award that might trigger the clause. 9
Because the Excessive Fines Clause has so little precedential history,'0'

its companion provision, the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause,' 0' may
provide some useful guidance about when and if the Excessive Fines Clause
applies in civil cases.'2 The Supreme Court has held, in the context of a
case centering on the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, that the
entire Eighth Amendment applies only to criminal or quasi-criminal cases. 03
Following that reasoning, the Court has developed a test for determining

when a remedy recovered by the government in a purportedly civil action
renders the action quasi-criminal for purposes of the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause. 1°4 The factors the Court has emphasized, such as
whether the remedy requires a showing of scienter, whether it traditionally
has been regarded as punishment, and whether it has a purpose other than
punishment, strongly suggest that punitive damages should fall under the

Eighth Amendment rubric when the government recovers a portion of an
award.

05

99. Id. at 298-99 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
100. See supra note 92 (noting absence of Excessive Fines Clause litigation).
101. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (prohibiting cruel and unusual punishments).
102. See
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§

3.6 (2d ed.

1989) (discussing quasi-criminal nature of punitive damages).
103. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977). In Ingraham the Court held that the Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Clause did not apply to the infliction of corporal punishment at a
public school. Id. The Court left open the possibility that the clause could apply in civil cases
involving persons held in mental or juvenile institutions. Id. at 699 n.37. The Court in
Browning-Ferris specifically stated that Ingraham does not control in Excessive Fines cases
because it involved an application of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. BrowningFerris Indus., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 263 n.2 (1989). However, the
Browning-FerrisCourt did note that the Ingraham decision was instructive. Id.
104. See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 (1963) (defining test to
determine when civil penalty becomes criminal for Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause
purposes).
105. Id. In Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez the Supreme Court enunciated a seven part
test for determining when a civil action by the government becomes criminal. The Court
considered:
[wlhether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, whether it has
historically been regarded as punishment, whether it comes into play only on a
finding of scienter, whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of
punishment-retribution and deterrence, whether the behavior to which it applies is
already a crime, whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be
connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the
alternative purpose assigned.
Id. at 168-69. Each of these criteria, with the possible exception of the first, militates toward
characterizing punitive awards as criminal penalties within the context of the Eighth Amendment. See Jeffries, supra note 5, at 150-51 (arguing that Mendoza-Martinez factors mandate
application of Eighth Amendment to traditional punitive awards). The Supreme Court had no
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In one of the few specific analyses of state allocation, Professor James
Ghiardi argued persuasively that the Excessive Fines Clause does limit the

government's recovery of punitive awards.'06 Professor Ghiardi initially
noted the Supreme Court's implication in Browning-Ferristhat the recovery
of a punitive award by the government would subject the procedure to
Excessive Fines Clause scrutiny.'07 Then, extrapolating from the Court's
decisions applying other criminal protections in ostensibly civil cases,108

Professor Ghiardi concluded that state allocation of a punitive award would
trigger the Excessive Fines Clause.'09 He reasoned that punitive damages

"serve to punish through the civil law conduct which might otherwise go
unpunished under the criminal law," 110 and that "[s]tates which collect part
of a punitive damage award in cases they did not prosecute are simply
states
exacting a punishment.""' Professor Ghiardi concluded that when
2
exact punitive mqasures, constitutional restraints should apply."
In McBride v. General Motors Corp.,"' a United States district court

held that the Excessive Fines Clause applied to Georgia's state allocation
statute." 4 In a decision that seems suspect on several levels,"' the court
held Georgia's state allocation statute unconstitutional on due process, equal
protection, excessive fines, and double jeopardy grounds."16 Relying pri-

marily on the Supreme Court's Browning-Ferris dictum hinting that state
allocation might implicate the Eighth Amendment, the district court held
that the statute triggered the Excessive Fines Clause." 7 The court then

reasori to apply this test to punitive damage awards in Browning-Ferrisbecause the Court
concluded that the framers of the Eighth Amendment did not intend the Eighth Amendment
protections to apply in cases of damages between private parties. Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S.
at 275. The Court emphasized that the Eighth Amendment "places limits on the steps a
government may take against an individual." Id. State allocation may thus trigger MendozaMartinez analysis because the government in part extracts a punitive award against an
individual. Under that analysis, these punitive awards seem clearly to implicate Eighth Amendment protections.
106. Ghiardi, supra note 11, at 120.
107. Id. at 126.
108. See supra note 105 and accompanying text (discussing application of Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause in civil cases); see also United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435
(1989) (applying Double Jeopardy Clause in civil case). For a complete analysis of Halper and
its application of criminal constitutional protections in purportedly civil cases, see infra part
II.C.
109. Ghiardi, supra note 11, at 128.
110. Id.at 121.
I11. Id.at 124.
112. Id.at 129.
113. 737 F. Supp. 1563 (M.D. Ga. 1990).
114. McBride v. General Motors Corp., 737 F. Supp. 1563, 1578 (M.D. Ga. 1990).
115. See supra note 90 (discussing questionable equal protection analysis in McBride).
116. McBride, 737 F. Supp. at 1578. The McBride court held the Georgia allocation
statute unconstitutional on several state constitutional grounds, including violation of the
provision limiting bills to one subject. Id.
117. Id.
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inexplicably concluded that the mere application of the clause, without any

consideration of excessiveness, rendered the statute unconstitutional."'
Critically related to the question of whether the Excessive Fines Clause
applies when the government receives a civil punitive award is the question
of whether the clause applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. In her dissent in Browning-Ferris, Justice O'Connor argued that it

does." 9 She noted that the Supreme Court regularly had applied the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment to the states,

and that the Court had assumed that the Excessive Bail Clause applied to

the states. 20 She concluded that she could find no reason "to distinguish
one Clause of the Eighth Amendment from another for purposes of incorporation." 2'
Because most state constitutions have an excessive fines provision similar
or identical to the federal one, '2 state courts generally do not apply the
federal Excessive Fines Clause.'2 At least one state court has held that the
Excessive Fines-Clause does not apply to the states."24 However, another
state court has more recently held that the clause does apply to the states.'2
Most commentators have argued that the clause applies to the states.'2
Because the other provisions of the Eighth Amendment do apply to the
states, and Justice O'Connor has argued that the Excessive Fines Clause

118. Id. The decision by the McBride court that the statute violates the Excessive Fines
Clause seems especially odd because no damages as yet had been awarded. The plaintiffs
sought only a declaratory judgment on the constitutional questions. Id. at 1564. The court
said simply, "the Act ... converts the civil nature action of the prior Georgia punitive
damages statute into a statute where fines are being made for the benefit of the State, contrary
to the constitutional prohibition as to excessive fines .... " Id. at 1578.
119. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., -492 U.S. 257, 284 (1989)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor noted that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
provision of the Eighth Amendment has been applied to the states at least since the Court's
decision in Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), reversing a state narcotics conviction
because the penalty constituted a cruel and unusual punishment. Browning-Ferris,492 U.S. at
284 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). She also noted that the Court has assumed, without ever
holding, that the Excessive Fines Clause also applies to the states. Id.
120. Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 284 (citing Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357 (1971)).
121. Id. at 284 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
122. E.g., KA. CoNsr., Bill of Rights, § 9 ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel & unusual punishment inflicted.").
123. See Sawyer v. Barbour, 300 P.2d 187, 190 (Cal. Ct. App. 1956) (applying only state
constitution excessive fines provision in criminal fines case); State v. Scherer, 721 P.2d 743,
746 (Kan. Ct. App. 1986) (same); State v. Wipke, 133 S.W.2d 354, 359 (Mo. 1939) (same).
124. People v. Elliot, 112 N.E. 300, 303 (IUI.1916).
125. See People v. Ingham, 453 N.Y.S.2d 325, 328 (Ct. Cl. 1982) (hoiding federal Excessive
Fines Clause applies to states). In Ingham the defendant had been arrested for driving while
intoxicated, an offense carrying a maximum $350 fine. Id. at 326. The court applied the New
York state constitution excessive fines provision and assumed that the United States Constitution
Excessive Fines Clause applied as well. Id. at 328. The court held that, because the defendant
had no income, a $350 fine was excessive. Id. at 329.
126. See, e.g., Ghiardi, supra note 11, at 125 n.57 (arguing that Excessive Fines Clause
applies to states); Jeffries, supra note 5, at 148 (1986) (same); Massey, supra note 93, at 1272

(same).
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applies to the states,127 it seems likely that the Supreme Court would conclude
that it does.
Assuming that the Excessive Fines Clause does apply when a state
allocates a portion of a civil punitive damage award, the final question
involves the determination of excessiveness.1 2 The common-law procedure
for assessing punitive damages has generally provided for judicial review of
awards, with reduction or remittitur if the court determines the award is
excessive. 2 9 However, no specific standards for evaluating excessiveness
have emerged. 30 One traditional test for determining the excessiveness of
3
punitive awards is whether the award "shocks the conscience of the court.' '
Courts often use the same type of vague "shock the conscience" test to
determine when a criminal fine is excessive. 132 Neither of these standards
provides much guidance for either practitioners or courts. Because legislatures fix criminal penalties, the issue of excessiveness of criminal fines
seldom arises. 33 In cases involving discretionary punitive damage awards,
the Eighth Amendment provides little guidance for evaluating excessiveness.
In her dissent in Browning-Ferris, Justice O'Connor recognized this
implicit problem. 34 O'Connor argued that reviewing courts should adopt a
balancing approach similar to the one used when applying the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause. 35 The test she proposed would compare the
127. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, 492 U.S. 257, 284 (1989) (O'Connor,
J., dissenting).
128. Significantly, the appellate court in Browning-Ferrisheld that the Eighth Amendment
might apply to punitive damage awards, but that an award of six million dollars did not
violate the Excessive Fines Clause in a case in which actual damages amounted to only fifty
thousand dollars. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 845 F.2d 404, 410 (2d
Cir. 1988).
129. See GmARDi & KmcHER, supra note 3, § 18.02 (discussing judicial procedures for
review of excessive awards). Generally a court will set aside an award only if it was based on
prejudice, passion, or bias, if it was based on a mistake of law or fact, if it lacks evidentiary
support, or if it shocks the conscience of the court. Id. In cases in which the court finds the
award excessive, the court will give the plaintiff the option of asking for a new trial on
damages or of remitting the part of the award that the court finds excessive. Id.
130. See id. § 18.05-.07 (noting absence of consistent standards for excessiveness of
punitive awards).
131. See id. § 18.02 (describing procedures for review of punitive awards).
132. See State v. Wipke, 133 S.W.2d 354, 359 (Mo. 1939) (stating that criminal fine is
excessive if it "would shock the mind of every man possessed of a common feeling").
133. See Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 262 (1989)
(noting that Supreme Court never had considered case applying Excessive Fines Clause); see
also Sawyer v. Barbour, 300 P.2d 187, 193 (Cal. Ct. App. 1956) (stating that "[t]he courts
will not hold a fine excessive within the constitutional prohibition unless there is a conflict
between the enactment of the Legislature and the [state] Constitution").
134. Browning-Ferris,492 U.S. at 300 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (acknowledging difficulty
of determining when punitive award is excessive).
135. Id. at 300-01. Some state courts already have implemented a balancing approach
when applying a state constitutional excessive fines prohibition. See State v. Scherer, 721 P.2d
743, 750 (Kan. Ct. App. 1986). In Scherer the Kansas court held that, in determining when a
court imposed sentence violates the state's excessive fines clause, a court should consider the
nature of the offense, a comparison of punishments for other offenses in the same jurisdiction,
and a comparison of punishments for the same offense in other jurisdictions. Id.
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civil punishment with the criminal punishments imposed for comparable
behavior. 3 6 This test frequently would prove unworkable because many of
the civil violations, such as breach of contract, that can result in punitive
awards have no criminal counterpart. 37 Probably, then, courts will rely on
3
existing procedures as providing enough protection against excessiveness.
C.

The Double Jeopardy Clause

The civil penalty approach to the property interest question may implicate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment in addition to
the Excessive Fines Clause. The Double Jeopardy Clause provides that no
person shall "be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy
'
of life or limb." 139
The Supreme Court has interpreted this clause to provide
two distinct protections.Y° First, the clause protects a defendant who has
been prosecuted for an offense, whether convicted or acquitted, from a
subsequent prosecution for the same conduct. 14' Second, the clause protects

136. Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 301 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). O'Connor stated that
in applying the balancing test courts should take into account prisofn time when comparing
criminal penalties with civil penalties. Id. That comparison would raise additional problems
for courts in determining what amount of money would compare with a given prison sentence.
137. Punitive damages remain relatively rare in cases other than personal injury and
products liability. However, over the last quarter century, punitive damages have grown most
in the areas of contracts and business torts. See Michael C. Maher, Torts Debate: Reformers'
Position Disputed, NAT'L L.J. July 30, 1990, at 15, 15 (citing Rand Corporation study
describing growth of punitive damages). State allocation will affect these awards in the same
way that it affects punitive awards in personal injury cases.
138. But see Bittle, supra note 93, at 1455-71 (analyzing methods of determining excessiveness of punitive awards). The author argues that existing standards for determining excessiveness of punitive damage awards are inadequate under the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 145557. He argues against using the defendant's wealth as a measure of proportionality because
that information may bias jurors. Id. at 1457-58. He also argues against using subjective
measures of the "wrongfulness" of the defendant's -conduct. Id. at 1462. He argues against
tying punitive awards to the size of compensatory awards because this measure can be arbitrary
and can ignore the cost to society of the defendant's conduct. Id. at 1465. Instead of these
procedures, he proposes adoption of a proportionality test similar to the one outlined in Solem
v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290-92 (1983), for review of punishments under the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause. Bittle, supra note 93, at 1449. That test involves comparisons of
punishments for similar offenses in the other jurisdictions, and of different offenses in the
same jurisdiction. Solem, 463 U.S. at 290-92.
However, courts have endorsed the standards that he criticizes when determining excessiveness of criminal fines. See People v. Ingham, 453 N.Y.S.2d 325, 326-27 (Ct. Cl. 1982)
(arguing that defendant's wealth is central factor in determining excessiveness); State v. Staub,
162 So. 766, 768 (La. 1935) (same); Burlington, C. R. & N. R. Co. v. Dey, 48 N.W. 98, 10506 (Iowa 1891) (same). Additionally, in Browning-Ferris,Justice O'Connor suggested hat the
defendant's wealth and the gravity of the defendant's conduct should be taken into account
in determining excessiveness. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S.
257, 300 (1989) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
139. U.S. CONST. amend. V.

140. See Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 164-65 (1977) (describing double jeopardy protections).
141. Id.
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a defendant from multiple punishments arising from a single offense.1 42
State allocation of punitive damage awards may violate one or both of
143
these prohibitions.
The Supreme Court has held that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not
bar the government from pursuing both civil and criminal actions against

a defendant in regard to a single offense.'" The Court has also held that
the government can share in a civil remedial award recovered by a private

plaintiff against defendants who have already been criminally prosecuted
for the conduct in question. In United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 41 the

Court held that a previous prosecution did not bar the government from
recovering part of a civil award in a qui tam action.'" The Hess Court

argued that only a criminal punishment, as opposed to a civil remedy, could
trigger double jeopardy protections. 147 The Court stressed the distinction
between punitive intent and remedial intent in determining the criminal or
civil character of an action.' 48 The Court found that the civil award in Hess
served primarily a remedial1 49purpose, and that, therefore, the action did not
implicate double jeopardy.

142. Id.
143. See Benton V. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 796 (1969) (holding Double Jeopardy Clause
applies to states through Fourteenth Amendment).
144. Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938). In Mitchell the Supreme Court held that
imposition of a 50% penalty for taxpayer fraud did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause
when the defendant taxpayer had been acquitted of criminal willful attempt to evade taxes.
Id. at 402-04. The Court stated that "Congress may impose both a criminal and a civil
sanction in respect to the same act or omission; for the double jeopardy clause prohibits
merely punishing twice, or attempting a second time to punish criminally, for the same
offense." Id. at 399. The Court said that a sanction would be criminal if it did not serve a
remedial purpose, but rather was intended as punishment. Id. at 398.
145. 317 U.S. 537 (1943).
146. United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 553 (1943). Hess involved several
contractors to a Public Works Administration project who had previously been prosecuted for
fraud of the government. Id. at 545. They had pleaded nolo contendere and been fined
$54,000. Id. Subsequently, in a qui tam action brought under a federal statute, petitioner
Marcus successfully brought a civil suit against them also alleging fraud against the government.
Id. at 539. Pursuant to the statute, Marcus took one half of the civil award and the government
took the other half. Id. at 540. The appellate court reversed, holding that the fraud did not
fall under the statute. Id. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court on that issue, and
further held that the civil action brought subsequent to the criminal prosecution did not violate
the Double Jeopardy Clause. Id. at 552-53.
147. Id. at 548-49.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 550. Although in Hess the Supreme Court found that the civil action served
a remedial, as opposed to punitive, purpose, the Court hinted strongly that the government
could have recovered purely punitive damages. Id. The Court stated that "[p]unitive or
exemplary damages have been held recoverable under a statute like this which combines
provision for criminal punishment with others which afford a civil remedy to the individual
injured. The law can provide the same measure of damage for the government as it can for
an individual." Id. at 551.
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Hess held that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar the government
from recovering remedial civil damages from a defendant who has been
criminally prosecuted. 15 0 Historically, the prohibition against double jeopardy has not barred a private plaintiff from recovering punitive civil damages
from a defendant who has already been criminally prosecuted or may be
subject to criminal prosecution for the conduct in question.' 5' In Hansen v.
Johns-Manville Products Corp.,152 the United States Court of Appeals for

the Fifth Circuit held that the imposition of multiple punitive awards in

private civil litigation does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause because
the proceedings are not "essentially criminal."' 53 The Fifth Circuit emphasized that double jeopardy protections apply only in criminal proceedings. 5 4
Hansen suggests that civil punitive awards between private parties will
not trigger double jeopardy protections. 155 Hess implies that the government

can recover an award substantially above its actual damages against a
defendant already prosecuted for the conduct in question.' 56 However, these
cases also indicate that when a sanction is intended as punishment and a
proceeding is essentially criminal in nature, double jeopardy protections will

apply.5 7 The question remains whether state allocation of punitive civil

awards fits into that category.
In its decision in United States v. Halper, the Supreme Court for the
first time held that the imposition of punitive damages in a civil suit may
violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. 5 In Halper, the government brought

150. Id. at 550.
151. See, e.g., Eddy v. McGinnis, 523 N.E.2d 737, 741 (Ind. 1988) (allowing punitive
award against defendant who had been criminally prosecuted for same conduct); Tuttle v.
Raymond, 494 A.2d 1353, 1357-58 (Me. 1985) (same); Wittman v. Gilson, 520 N.E.2d 514,
515 (N.Y. 1988) (same).
152. 734 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1051 (1985).
153. Hansen v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 734 F.2d 1036, 1042 (1984), cert. denied,
470 U.S. 1051 (1985). In determining that double jeopardy protections apply only to proceedings
which are "essentially criminal," the Fifth Circuit relied on the Supreme Court's holding to
that effect in Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975). Hansen, 734 F.2d at 1042. In Breed the
Supreme Court established several factors for determining when a proceeding is "essentially
criminal," including the purpose of the proceeding, the potential consequences, and the fact
that the action was brought by the state. 421 U.S. at 528. In Hansen, the Fifth Circuit found
that those factors did not apply in a civil action awarding punitive damages because the action
was not brought to determine whether the defendant had violated a criminal law, the
consequences of the action did not carry the stigma associated with a criminal prosecution,
and the government did not bring the action. Hansen, 734 F.2d at 1042.
154. Hansen, 734 F.2d at 1042.
155. See also United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 451 (1989) (stating that Double
Jeopardy Clause protections are not triggered by litigation between private parties).
156. See supra note 149 (discussing Hess implication that government can recover punitive
award without violating Double Jeopardy Clause).
157. See supra note 153 and accompanying text (describing method for determining when
proceeding is criminal for double jeopardy purposes).
158. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989). In Halper, the manager of a medical
laboratory had been previously convicted of filing false claims with the government. Id. at
437. The government subsequently brought a civil action against him. Id. at 438. The district
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a civil action under the False Claims Act 5 9 against a defendant who had
been criminally convicted of submitting false Medicare claims. 60 The Supreme Court remanded the case for a determination of the government's
actual damages, holding that if in the subsequent civil action the government
recovered damages unrelated to its actual damages, that action constituted

"punishment" and thus subjected the defendant to double jeopardy.' 6' The
Court hinted strongly that double jeopardy protections would apply in any
action in which the government recovered a purely punitive award. 62
The Halper Court de-emphasized the distinction between .the labels
"criminal" and "civil" in determining when an action exacts punishment
for double jeopardy purposes. 63 The Court stated that "It]he notion of
punishment, ... , cuts across the division between the civil and the criminal
law, and for the purposes of assessing whether a given sanction constitutes
multiple punishment barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause, we must follow

the notion where it leads.'' 16 The Court held that if the trial court found
that the civil action served primarily a punitive purpose, the action would
constitute double jeopardy. 16
court granted summary judgment for the defendant on the ground that the imposition of the
statutorily required civil penalty, which the court determined was punitive in nature, subjected
the defendant to double jeopardy. Id. at 439. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's
reasoning but remanded for a determination of whether the penalty was actually punitive. Id.
at 452.
159. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3731 (1988).
160. Halper, 490 U.S. at 437-38.
161. Id. at 449-50. The decision in Halper exemplifies the confusion surrounding the
application of the Double Jeopardy Clause. See MARTiN L. FRIEDLAND, DoUBLE JEoPARDY
199 (1969) (noting confusion of courts in distinguishing two prongs of double jeopardy). The
twin components of double jeopardy are designed to protect two separate interests. The
prohibition against successive prosecutions insures finality of judgments. See WAYNE R. LAFAvE
& JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 25.1 (2d ed. 1992) (discussing policy behind
double jeopardy protection). The prohibition against multiple punishments insures that the
court does not exceed its legislative authorization by imposing more than one punishment for
a single offense. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165 (1977). In general, the multiple punishment
prong applies in the context of a single prosecution. Id. Typically, multiple punishment
questions arise when the government prosecutes a defendant, in one proceeding, for two
offenses, one of which is a lesser, included offense of the other. See, e.g.,
Jeffers v. United
States, 432 U.S. 137, 157-58 (1977) (holding that Double Jeopardy Clause bars imposition, in
one proceeding, of cumulative punishments for "same offense"). A defendant punished in
separate, successive actions should be protected by the successive prosecution prong.
Halper confuses the two interests and the two prongs of double jeopardy by prohibiting
successive punishments in separate proceedings. The case is, in actuality, a successive prosecution case. By restricting double jeopardy protections to criminal actions-prosecutionsprior Supreme Court decisions on double jeopardy questions in civil cases had held firm to
the successive prosecution approach. See United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537,
548-49 (1942) (arguing that only criminal punishment can trigger double jeopardy). Had the
Halper Court followed those decisions, it would have subjected civil penalties to double
jeopardy analysis only if it determined that a nominally civil action was in fact criminal.
162. Halper, 490 U.S. at 448-49.M
163. Id.at 447.
164. Id.at 447-48.
165. Id.at 449-50.
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The decision suggests that state allocation of punitive awards may

implicate double jeopardy.

66

The Court stated specifically that "[t]he pro-

tections of the Double Jeopardy Clause are not triggered by litigation

between private parties." 16 7 However, the Court stressed that when the
government seeks to extract a civil penalty that bears no relation to its
actual damages, double jeopardy protections apply. 6s While specifically
declining to resolve the issue, the Halper Court noted its belief that the

Hess Court had assumed that double jeopardy protections apply in qui tam
actions.

69

Under a state allocation statute the state receives part of a purely

punitive civil award, and such an action resembles a qui tam action in that
the government and a civil plaintiff share an award, 70 so it seems likely
that the Halper Court would find that state allocation triggers double
jeopardy.

That question is, however, by no means settled. The Halper Court
emphasized that in a qui tam action the plaintiff sues in the name of the

government.' 7' In an action under a state allocation statute, the government
is not a party even in name. Central to the theory of double jeopardy is
the idea that the government should not use its power and resources to

subject a defendant to repeated prosecutions. 72 Therefore, a court may find
that the mere diversion of money to the government does not by itself

distinguish that type of action from a private civil action immune from
double jeopardy analysis.17 Also, Halper and Hess both involved civil

166. See id. at 447 n.8 (noting that punitive damages clearly serve punitive goals).
167. Id. at 451.
168. Id. at 449. The Court enunciated a test for determining when a civil action triggers
double jeopardy: "Where a defendant previously has sustained a criminal penalty and the civil
penalty sought in the subsequent proceeding bears no rational relation to the goal of compensating the Government for its loss, but rather appears to qualify as "punishment," ....
then
the defendant is entitled to an accounting of the Government's damages . . to determine if
the penalty sought in fact constitutes a second punishment." Id.
169. Id. at 451 n.ll. In discussing when a civil action triggers double jeopardy, the Court
in Halper distinguished Hess, a qui tam action, on the ground that in Hess the government
received damages roughly commensurate to its actual losses. ld. at 445. The Halper Court
said that the Hess Court had assumed but not decided that double jeopardy protections would
apply in a qui tam action in which the government received punitive damages. Id. at 451 n.11.
In fact, the Hess Court implied that the government could itself sue for punitive damages
without triggering double jeopardy. See supra note 149 (discussing Hess decision).
170. A qui tam action is an action brought on behalf of the government by a private
party, who receives part of the recovery as compensation for his or her efforts. United States
ex rel. Givler v. Smith, 760 F. Supp. 72, 72 n.1 (E.D. Pa. 1991). The phrase is taken from
the Latin "qui tam pro domino rege, quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur," which means
"who as well for the king as for himself sues in this matter." Id.
171. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 451 n.11 (1989).
172. See Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957) (discussing rationale behind
double jeopardy protection).
173. See Elizabeth S. Jahncke, Note, United States v. Halper, Punitive Civil Fines, and
the Double Jeopardy and Excessive Fines Clauses, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 112, 115 (1991) (arguing
that Excessive Fines Clause protections, rather than Doqble Jeopardy Clause protections,

should apply to punitive civil fines); see also SCHLUETER &

REDDING,

supra note 102, § 3.6
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fines.1 74 The role of punitive damages as ancillary to a compensatory recovery

might influence
a court to distinguish a punitive award from the civil fine
175
in Halper.
The uncertain footing on which Halper stands could also temper the
expansion of its holding. The Halper Court misapplied the double jeopardy

176
protections by prohibiting multiple punishments in successive proceedings.
The Court should have treated Halper as a successive prosecution case and

applied double jeopardy only if it found that the civil action was in fact
criminal.177 If the decision stands as written, it raises almost insurmountable
practical problems. If a criminal prosecution bars a subsequent civil punitive
recovery, then a punitive recovery must bar a subsequent criminal prosecution. Because the regulatory branches of the government do not act in
concert with the criminal branch, that proposition raises the absurd prospect
of a tax penalty imposed by the Internal Revenue Service barring a criminal

prosecution for the same conduct. 17 A rule requiring such a result seems
unlikely to survive.
Despite its confused logic and problematic holding, however, Halper
may stand and may apply to state allocation of punitive awards. In the
context of state allocation, many of its unanswered questions have even
greater import. For example, the decision does not specify a test to determine
whether a civil "offense" is the same as a criminal offense for double
jeopardy purposes. 79 Nor does it address whether the Double Jeopardy
Clause prevents the imposition of multiple civil penalties, such as multiple
punitive awards in products liability cases under an allocation scheme. 10

(discussing constitutional restraints on punitive awards). The authors note that punitive damages
differ significantly from criminal penalties in that they do not carry the possibility of
imprisonment and do not stigmatize the defendant to the same degree. Id. But see supra note
105 (describing Mendoza-Martinez factors for determining when civil action by government
becomes quasi-criminal).
174. Halper, 490 U.S. at 438; United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 539
(1943).
175. Halper, 490 U.S. at 438.
176. See supra note 161 (discussing Halper Court's misapplication of double jeopardy).
177. See supra note 161 (discussing HalperCourt's misapplication of double jeopardy).
178. See Jahncke, supra note 173, at 114 (noting possible civil-criminal conflicts involving
tax, antitrust, and insider trading proceedings, among others).
179. See LAFAvE & IsRAEL, supra note 161, § 17.4 (discussing meaning of "same offense"
for double jeopardy purposes). The traditional test for determining whether offenses are the
same for double jeopardy purposes is the Blockburger test. Id. Under the Blockburger test,
two offenses are the same unless one requires proof of a fact which the other does not. Id.
The Supreme Court never mentioned the Blockburger test in Halper, probably because the
Court treated Halper as a cumulative punishment case. See supra note 161 (discussing Halper
Court's misapplication of double jeopardy). The Supreme Court has held that Blockburger is
not controlling in cumulative punishment cases. Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 340
(1981). Because application of double jeopardy to punitive awards really creates a successive
prosecution issue, rather than a multiple punishment issue, see supra note DJ161 (discussing
Halper Court's misapplication of double jeopardy), use of some test to determine whether
offenses are the same seems necessary.
180. See GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(2) (Michie 1987) (allowing only one punitive award
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The resolution of these issues will critically affect the nature and practice
of state allocation.
As a practical matter, state allocation could survive even subject to the
full extent of double jeopardy protection. For many years Indiana barred
a plaintiff from recovering punitive damages against a defendant who was
also subject to criminal prosecution for the conduct in question.' 8' Though
Indiana recently abandoned that rule, 82 called the Taber rule, that principle
still could provide a viable method of avoiding double jeopardy challenges
to state allocation statutes.' However, if incorporated into state allocation
statutes unmodified, such a rule might eliminate all beneficial aspects of
punitive damages by prohibiting punitive awards against corporations in the
most harmful product liability cases. Corporations increasingly are subject
to criminal prosecution,' 84 and corporations are protected by the Double
Jeopardy Clause. 83 In order to remain viable, then, an allocation statute
could except corporations from punitive awards only in cases in which the
corporation actually has been prosecuted.' 6

in products liability cases). Georgia's "one award" provision would eliminate double jeopardy
concerns in regard to products liability cases. Id. From a policy perspective, that sort of
provision makes sense because, while no single punitive award is likely to be excessive, an
open-ended series of awards certainly could be. However, the district court in McBride v.
General Motors Corp., 737 F. Supp. 1563 (M.D. Ga. 1990), held that the Georgia one award
provision violates the Equal Protection Clause by creating an arbitrary and unreasonable
classification between products liability plaintiffs and other tort plaintiffs. Id. at 1576. That
decision probably has little precedential value, because it clearly departs from the accepted
view of equal protection analysis. See supra note 90 (critiquing McBride court's application
of Equal Protection Clause).
181. See Taber v. Hutson, 5 Ind. 322, 325 (1854) (disallowing recovery of punitive
damages arising from tort that is also subject of criminal prosecution). The Taber court held
not that the imposition of punitive awards against defendants subject to criminal prosecution
violated the state double jeopardy clause, but only that such a practice was not in "accord
with the spirit of our institutions." Id.
182. See INDo. CODE ANN. § 34-4-30-2 (Burns 1986) (providing that criminal prosecution
is no defense in action for punitive damages). In Eddy v. McGinnis, 523 N.E.2d 737 (Ind.
1988), the Indiana Supreme Court held that the statute abrogated the Taber rule and that the
statute did not violate the state prohibition against double jeopardy. Id. at 738.
183. A rule exempting defendants subject to criminal prosecution from punitive damages
would not in itself eviscerate punitive awards. First, punitive awards lose much, if not all, of
their validity when directed against defendants subject to the criminal justice system. See
GmE1ai & KmCHER, supra note 3, § 2.02 (noting that civil punishment is chief rationale for
punitive damages). Second, much of the conduct that is subject to punitive awards, such as
breach of contract and business tort, is not subject to criminal punishment.
184. See WAYNE R. LAFAvE & AusTn; W. ScoTT, JR., CRIMnNAL LAW § 3.10(a) (2d ed.
1986) (discussing development of corporate criminal liability). Corporate liability is most
common in regard to crimes against property. Id. However, corporations can also be guilty
of violent crimes such as manslaughter, and almost certainly murder. Id.
185. See United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 567 (1977) (holding
that Double Jeopardy Clause applies to corporations); United States v. Security Nat'l Bank,
546 F.2d 492, 494 (2d Cir. 1976) (same), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 950 (1977).
186. A rule excepting corporations from punitive damages only when they have actually
been prosecuted might collaterally insulate corporations from criminal prosecution after they
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PRACTICE AND POLICY

State allocation of punitive awards is a dramatic alteration of an
established civil-law procedure. For that reason, state allocation will meet
with skepticism and resistance. That resistance may be especially strong
because of the historical controversy surrounding punitive damages.' s8 However, if properly drafted, state allocation statutes fall squarely within constitutional parameters. Moreover, state allocation does not merely adjust
the focus of punitive damages. Instead, it provides a practical reform of
punitive damages while maintaining the beneficial aspects of such awards.
Working within the guidelines provided by the constitutional issues
presented above, workable state allocation statutes should prove fairly easy
to create. Though state allocation generally should survive constitutional
scrutiny without these precautions, inclusion of the following provisions will
guarantee constitutionality. First, the statute should establish unequivocally
the point at which the state's interest attaches by giving the government the
rights of a judgment creditor with the same standing as the plaintiff.188 That
type of provision will eliminate the possibility of Takings Clause challenges,
which to this point have composed the primary tests of state allocation
statutes.18 9 Second, as a corollary point, the statute should make clear that
punitive damages awarded under it serve purely retributive and deterrent
purposes. Such a provision will guarantee that the plaintiff cannot claim a
property interest in the award prior to entry of judgment.1t 0
Provisions giving the state the rights of a judgment creditor will shift
the constitutional focus from the plaintiff to the defendant. States should
take precautions to avoid the resulting possible criminal constitutional
entanglements. The statute should establish either specific standards for the
size of awards or guidelines for determining excessiveness.191 Many states
have incurred punitive damages. Such a result would not prove destructive because the elastic
nature of punitive awards almost certainly make§ them a more effective deterrent, and therefore
a more effective sanction, than static statutory fines. See generally Amelia J. Toy, Comment,
Statutory Punitive Damage Caps and the Profit Motive, 40 EMORY L.J. 303 (1991) (discussing
powerful deterrent effect of flexible punitive damages).
187. See supra note 5 (noting conflicting views about constitutionality of punitive damages).
188. See GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(2) (Michie 1987) (giving state rights of judgment

creditor on same footing with plaintiff).
189. See supra part II.A (discussing Takings Clause challenges). Note that the district
court in McBride v. General Motors Corp., 737 F. Supp. 1563 (M.D. Ga. 1990), held the
Georgia allocation statute unconstitutional on due process, equal protection, excessive fines,
double jeopardy, and several state constitutional grounds. Id. at 1579. Though clearly eager

to strike down the statute, the court did not even mention the Takings Clause. Significantly,
Georgia's state allocation statute gives the state the rights of a judgment creditor on an equal
footing with the plaintiff. GA. CoDE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(2) (Michie 1987).

190. See supranote 43 (discussing potential conflict about compensatory factor in punitive
awards).
191. See Toy, supra note 186, at 324-26 (arguing that unpredictability about size of
punitive award is essential to deterrence). The author argues that absolute caps and limits
tying punitive awards to compensatory awards fall to deter potential defendants who expect
to clear a profit greater than the statutorily prescribed amount. Id. at 336.
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already cap punitive awards and some cap awards in connection with state
allocation statutes. 92 States that do not choose to cap punitive damages
probably can avoid Excessive Fines Clause problems simply by providing
guidelines for determining excessiveness.' 93 Those guidelines could take the
form of traditional punitive damages standards of evaluation, taking into
account the gravity of the defendant's conduct, the harm to the plaintiff,
and the defendant's wealth,9 4 or the form of the proportionality test
common to evaluations of punishments under the Cruel and Unusual

Punishments Clause. 9 5 Finally, application of the Double Jeopardy Clause
may require states to incorporate into the statute a variation of the Taber
rule, limiting the imposition of punitive damages against defendants who
are subject to criminal prosecution for the conduct in question. 96
These guidelines will protect state allocation from constitutional scrutiny.
Still, questions remain about the desirability of the practice. Opponents of
traditional punitive damages base their criticism on three principal arguments. The first of these asserts that excessive punitive awards are crippling

industry by driving up insurance costs. 97 This argument rests on the widespread belief that in recent years the number and size of punitive awards

192. See GHI&mi & KIRcHER, supra note 3, § 21.15 (Supp. 1991) (noting that twelve
states cap punitive awards). Of the states that cap punitive awards, Colorado, Florida, Georgia,
and Kansas also have state allocation statutes. See CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-102(4)
(West 1987) (limiting punitive damages to actual damages or, in certain cases, up to three
times actual damages at discretion of trial judge); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73(2)(b) (West 1986)
(limiting punitive damages to three times compensatory damages except in certain cases); GA.
CODE ANrN. § 51-12-5.1(2) (1987) (limiting punitive damages to $250,000 except in product
liability or intentional tort cases and allowing only one punitive award in product liability
cases); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3402 (1987) (limiting punitive damages to lesser of defendant's
annual gross income over preceding three years or $5,000,000).
193. See Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 301 (1989)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing for adoption of broad guidelines for judicial review to
insure against excessiveness of punitive awards).
194. See GHLARi & KMCHER, supra note 3, § 18.08 (discussing existing standards for
evaluating punitive awards).
195. See supra note 135 and accompanying text (discussing use of Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause balancing approach to determine excessiveness). In Browning-FerrisJustice
O'Connor argued for adoption of a hybrid approach to excessiveness, using the balancing test
factors, such as comparisons of punishments for the same conduct in other jurisdictions, in
addition to the traditional factors, such as the defendant's wealth. Browning-Ferris,492 U.S.
at 300 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
196. See supra note 181 and accompanying text (describing Taber rule and policy reasons
supporting it).
197. See Jehl, supra note 10, at 1 (reporting Vice President Quayle's assertion that
cumbersome American civil justice system puts United States at "competitive disadvantage").
But see Robert E. Litan, The Liability Explosion.and American Trade Performance: Myths
and Realities, in TORT LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 127 (Peter H. Schuck ed., 1991)
(concluding that growth in liability may hurt innovation but probably does not affect trade
balance); Maher, supra note 137, at 15 (arguing that punitive damages crisis is overstated).
Mr. Maher notes a study by the Rand Corporation that found that the costs of products
liability adds less than one percent to the price of most products and that foreign companies
face the same liability costs that American companies face. Id.
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In fact, the evidence suggests that, at least in regard to

personal injury cases, the level of punitive awards has remained fairly steady
over the past twenty-five years.'

99

Beyond that practical economic argument, critics also focus on traditional ideological concerns. They argue that punitive awards are simply
windfalls for greedy plaintiffs who already have been compensated for their

injuries.? Finally, critics argue that punitive damages subject defendants to
arbitrary punishments improperly. administered through the civil courts. 20'

State allocation addresses these complaints. First, it addresses the economic criticism, whether or not that criticism is valid, by providing a means
by which the state can regulate levels of punitive awards on a state-wide
scale." If the legislature concludes that awards have become excessive, it
can increase the share the state takes in order to reduce the incentive to
sue for punitive damages. 20 3 Conversely, if the state determines that com-

panies or individuals have become indifferent to public safety, it can decrease
198. See Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 282 (1989)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (stating that "[a]wards of punitive damages are skyrocketing").
199. See Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort
Litigation System -

And Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1147, 1254-56 (1992) (citing study

by Rand Institute for Civil Justice finding punitive damages in personal injury cases have
remained steady for past 25 years). Professor Saks notes another study finding that while the
number of punitive awards has remained steady, the size of the average award has risen. Id.
at 1256. However, he also points out that the rate of increase in the size of the average
punitive award has not matched the increase in the wealth of Fortune 500 companies, suggesting
that awards may in fact have become less "punitive." Id. at 1256 n.403.
200. See REDDEN, supra note 43, § 3.9 (noting common criticism that punitive damages
are windfall to plaintiffs).
201. Id.

202. See Toy, supra note 186 (arguing against caps or proscriptions of punitive damages).
In an article heavy with statistical data and probabilities, Ms. Toy argues convincingly that
punitive damages serve a valuable deterrent effect. Cf. REDDEN, supra note 43, § 3.8-.9
(asserting lack of evidence of deterrent effect of punitive damages).
203. See Gordon v. State, 608 So. 2d 800 (Fla. 1992), cert. denied, 61 U.S.L.W. 3568
(U.S. Mar. 29, 1993) (No. 92-1328) (discussing state interest in regard to substantive due
process challenge). In Gordon the Florida Supreme Court said that the state had a legitimate
objective in attempting "to discourage punitive claims by making them less remunerative to
the claimant and the claimant's attorney." Id. at 802. The virtual absence of state legislative
history makes discovery of a legislature's intent problematic. However, that statement indicates
that the state of Florida intends the statute to have a deterrent effect on the filing of punitive
claims.
The effect that state allocation has on attorney's fees will affect critically the disincentive
aspect of the practice. The Florida statute specifically provides for attorney's fees to be
calculated solely on the basis of the plaintiff's share of the recovery. FLA. STAT. ANN. §
768.73(2)(b) (West 1986). Several other states have incorporated provisions into their allocation
statutes specifying payment of attorney's fees before allocation of the award. Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 537.675 (Vernon 1988); OR. REv. STAT. § 18.540(3) (1988); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-1(3)
(1989). That practice will almost certainly reduce the power of the state to regulate awards
through allocation because the allocation provision will not in any way affect the amount of
money the attorney recovers. For state allocation to provide any disincentive to sue for punitive
damages, it must cut into the share the attorney hopes to receive. States that do not specify
a treatment of attorney's awards will need to resolve that question.
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its portion in order to increase the incentive to sue for damages. Additionally, in cases that are likely to result in punitive damages, state allocation
provides an incentive for both parties to settle. 204
By putting the share of awards that the state receives into a public

benefit fund, state allocation addresses the windfall problem and at the
same time serves a valuable public policy function. 20 5 It also eliminates
concerns about the arbitrary nature of punishments administered through
the civil courts, by invoking constitutional protections that have never
applied to traditional punitive awards. 6 Most importantly, by triggering
the Excessive Fines Clause, state allocation probably will bring a contro-

versial area of the law under the constitutional mantle and will insure a
degree of fairness in a largely subjective procedure. 2 7 State allocation may
also trigger some degree of double jeopardy scrutiny, thus giving civil
defendants the same protection from multiple punishments afforded criminal
defendants. 2°
Central to any policy discussion of state allocation is the question of
whether juries should know of the scheme in fixing awards. The prevailing
view appears to be that juries should not know of the allocation provision.
Of the existing allocation statutes, only the Florida statute addresses that
issue specifically, by precluding courts from informing juries of the allocation provision. 9 The Oregon Supreme Court has held that it is. reversible
error for a court to instruct the jury that a portion of a punitive award
will go to the state.2 10 This approach apparently stems from a fear that, if
instructed of the allocation scheme, juries will inflate awards either to make
amount or to benefit whatever public fund
sure the plaintiff gets a certain
,
receives the state's share.

21

204. In cases in which a punitive award is likely, the defendant will have an incentive to
settle for one dollar less than the amount of the expected award. The plaintiff will have an
incentive to settle for one dollar more than the share of that award that she would get under
the allocation scheme. Depending on the probability of recovery of a punitive award, the
parties will settle somewhere between those two amounts. Improved guidelines for measuring
awards will allow the parties to estimate the size of the expected recovery.
205. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 668A.1 (West 1987) (allocating state's share of punitive
awards to Civil Reparations Trust Fund); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.675 (Vernon 1988) (allocating
state's share of punitive awards to Tort Victims' Compensation Fund); OR. REv. STAT. §
18.540(3) (1988) (allocating state's share of punitive awards to Criminal Injuries Compensation
Fund).
206. See supra note 93 (citing commentators arguing for constitutional restraints on
punitive damages).
207. See supra part II.B (discussing Excessive Fines Clause implications of state allocation).
208. See supra part II.C (discussing double jeopardy implications of state allocation).
209. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73(5) (West 1986) (stating that "[t]he jury shall not be
instructed, nor shall it be informed, as to the provisions of this section").
210. Honeywell v. Sterling Furniture Co., 797 P.2d 1019, 1021 (Or. 1990).
211. See N.Y. Crv. PRAc. L. & R. 8701 (McKinney Supp. 1993) (suggesting that jury
should not know of allocation statute). The Practice Commentary accompanying the New
York statute argues that juries that know of the allocation provision might inflate awards in
order to better compensate the plaintiff or increase state revenues. Id.
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IV.

CONCLUSION

State allocation is a practical, policy-oriented response to the controversial issues surrounding punitive damages. It succeeds in mitigating or
eliminating the primary sources of criticism inherent in the doctrine. At the
same time, it preserves the valuable deterrent aspect of punitive damages,
putting the proceeds to a beneficial public use. The questions confronting
the practice of state allocation have revolved around the failure of legislatures or courts to define adequately the state's interest in its share of the
award. Resolution of that issue, by giving the state the rights of a judgment
creditor upon entry of judgment, will clarify the rule and free it from
Takings Clause scrutiny. State allocation will then face the constitutional
proscriptions embodied in the Excessive Fines Clause and the Double
Jeopardy Clause, which, if applicable, can only strengthen the policy basis
for the practice.
PAUL

F. KiRois
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APPENDIX
TBE STATE STATUTES

Colorado

COLO. REv.

STAT. ANN.

§ 13-21-102(4) (West 1987).

Thirty-three percent of every punitive damage award goes to the state
general fund. Punitive damages are limited to the amount of compensatory
damages except in certain cases. The defendant's wealth is not to be
considered in assessing awards.
Florida

§ 768.73(2)(b) (West 1986).

FLA. STAT. ANN.

In personal injury and wrongful death cases, sixty percent of every
punitive damage award goes to the Public Medical Assistance Trust Fund.
In all other cases, sixty percent of every punitive damage award goes to the
state general fund. Attorney's fees are calculated solely on the basis of the
plaintiff's share. The jury is not instructed of the allocation provision.
Punitive damages are limited to the amount of compensatory damages
except in certain cases.
Georgia
GA. CODE ANN.

§ 51-12-5.1(2) (Michie 1987).

In products liability cases only, seventy-five percent of every punitive
damage award goes to the state treasury. Punitive damages in these cases,
though not limited, may only be awarded once. The state has the rights of
a judgment creditor on an equal footing with the plaintiff upon entry of
judgment.
Illinois
ILL.

ANN. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1207 (Smith-Hurd 1987).
The trial court has discretion to apportion every punitive damage award
among the plaintiff, the plaintiff's attorney, and the state's Department of
Rehabilitation Services.

Iowa
§ 668A.1 (West 1987).
In cases in which the defendant's conduct was not aimed specifically at
the plaintiff, seventy-five percent of every punitive damage award goes to
the state's Civil Reparations Trust Fund.
IOWA CODE ANN.

Kansas
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3402 (1987).
In medical malpractice cases only, fifty percent of every punitive damage
award goes to the state's Health Care Stabilization Fund. This statute only
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applies to causes of action accruing between July 1, 1985 and July 1, 1988.
Awards are limited partly on the basis of the defendant's wealth.
Missouri
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.675 (Vernon 1988).
Fifty percent of every punitive damage award goes to the state's Tort
Victims Compensation Fund. Attorney's fees are excluded.
New York
N.Y. Cirv., PRc. L. & R. 8701 (McKinney Supp. 1993).
Twenty percent of every punitive damage award goes to the state. This
law is effective only until April 1, 1994.
Oregon
OR. REv. STAT. § 18.540(3) (1988).
Fifty percent of every punitive damage award goes to the state's Criminal
Injuries Compensation Fund. Attorney's fees are excluded.
Utah
ANN. § 78-18-1(3) (1989).
Fifty percent of every punitive damage award goes to the state's general
fund. Attorney's fees are excluded. The defendant's wealth is admissible in
assessing awards.

UTAH CODE

